# arm

# **Compartments and** other aspects of Morello software work Arme Morello Soc

o Program

**CHERI Technical Workshop 2022** 

Yury Khrustalev -- Arm 06/09/2022

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### Agenda

- Morello toolchains and libraries: GCC, LLVM, Musl libc, etc
- OS bring-up: Android and Linux
- Morello compartmentalisation
- Tools and resources: CHERISeed, Morello IE

# **Software tools for Morello**

#### **GNU toolchain**

- Binutils
- GCC
- GDB
- Binutils

#### LLVM toolchain

- Clang and tools
- LLD
- LLDB
- Runtime libraries

#### Morello Firmware

Images for Morello board

#### Morello Platform Model

- Functional model of the Morello platform
- Supports the same software stacks as the hardware

#### CHERIseed

- Software-only implementation of CHERI C/C++ semantics
- Based on compiler instrumentation
- **Morello Instruction Emulator**
- Run Morello applications
- Trace and debug
- Analyse performance

#### Bionic

- C library for Android Glibc
- Implementation in progress

#### Musl C library

- Purecap target
- POSIX threads
- LDSO

#### Newlib

- C library for Baremetal
  Libshim
- Syscall translation layer

#### Linux Kernel

• Pure Capability user ABI

#### **Morello Development Studio**

- Arm Debugger for baremetal debug of the Morello
   FVP and Morello Board
- Support to import LLVM and GNU compilation tools
- Example projects to get started

## **Morello Firmware**

- Ongoing development with quarterly feature updates
- Prebuilt images for Morello board
- Standard 64-bit components supporting booting capability-enlightened environments
- UEFI boot manager to boot OS images from PCI devices and network boot
- Morello is supported as an open research platform

### **Morello Android**

- A full Android R profile 64-bit stack is supported on the Morello board
- Includes Morello purecap ports of the Android C library (Bionic) and a range of utilities and workloads introduced into a 64-bit AOSP environment
- Minimally modified ACK & userspace libshim support syscalls from purecap applications
- Enables a range of porting and research activities ahead of a full PCuABI kernel implementation

# **Morello Android**

#### **Current internal activities**

 Ongoing Bionic development, aligning with evolving Kernel PCuABI

#### Future work areas

- Currently investigating possible activities in other areas of Android
- Examples under discussion include minimal ART configurations or constrained approaches to porting elements of the Android graphics stack

## **Morello Linux Kernel**

- Main goal: supporting the pure-capability kernel-user ABI (PCuABI)
  - Ongoing effort to specify this ABI, candidate spec now public [1]
- Hybrid approach: in-kernel ABI unchanged, (only) user pointers become capabilities
  - Support for the traditional AArch64 ABI preserved through the COMPAT layer
- Status: prototype publicly released, targeting a transitional ABI [2]
  - Tested on the Morello board and FVP
  - Only functional PCuABI support at this stage: no enforcement of capability metadata
  - Support for a reduced set of syscalls and CONFIG options

[1] https://git.morello-project.org/morello/kernel/linux/-/wikis/Morello-pure-capability-kernel-user-Linux-ABI-specification

[2] <u>https://git.morello-project.org/morello/kernel/linux/-/wikis/Transitional-Morello-pure-capability-kernel-user-Linux-ABI-specification</u>

## **Morello Linux Kernel**

- Current focus: kernel testing
  - Morello kselftests run in Morello GitLab Cl
  - A subset of LTP and Musl tests are being deployed
- Next steps:
  - Progressing towards the complete PCuABI, primarily by restricting and enforcing capability bounds / permissions
  - Extending the number of supported syscalls and CONFIG options
- All development is now happening in the open contributions welcome!
  - Kernel repo: <u>https://git.morello-project.org/morello/kernel/linux</u>
  - Mailing list: <a href="https://op-lists.linaro.org/mailman3/lists/linux-morello.op-lists.linaro.org/">https://op-lists.linaro.org/mailman3/lists/linux-morello.op-lists.linaro.org/</a>

# **Morello toolchains**

#### **GNU toolchain**

- Targeting Baremetal and Linux
- Binutils, GDB and other tools
- Glibc
- git://sourceware.org/git/binutils-gdb.git branch: users/ARM/morello-binutils-gdb-master
- git://gcc.gnu.org/git/gcc.git
  branch: vendors/ARM/heads/morello
- git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git branch: arm/morello/main
- git://sourceware.org/git/binutils-gdb.git branch: users/ARM/morello-binutils-gdb-master

#### **LLVM toolchain**

- Targeting Baremetal, Android and Linux
- LLDB and other usual LLVM utilities

- https://git.morello-project.org/morello/llvm-project
- <u>https://git.morello-project.org/morello/llvm-project-releases</u>
  branch: morello/release-1.4
  branch: morello/baremetal-release-1.4

branch: morello/linux-aarch64-release-1.4




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
### **Sealed Capabilities in Morello**





# **Sealed Capabilities in Morello**

### Object Type (15 bits)



### To seal a capability, you need

- Sealing with any object type:
  - an unsealed capability
  - sealer capability that
    - + is in bounds
    - + has SEAL permission
    - + is valid (tag == 1)
    - + has value == object type
- Sealing with reserved object type:
  an unsealed capability



### Compartmentalisation

- Consider compartmentalisation in terms of transitions across boundaries between security domains
- Symmetrical model that works for any type of trust-mistrust relationship (both ways)
- Focus on the information that is transferred across the boundary in any direction
- ...and what data is protected against leaking through the boundary
- Compartmentalisation is managing transitions between security domains

## **Threat model**

#### Overview

- An application is partitioned into security domains
- Some security domain may be compromised
- Aim is to prevent escaping from the compromised compartment
- We want to restrict access to data and execution of code in other security domains

#### An adversary has...


- Arbitrary\* read and write memory gadgets
- Arbitrary read and write register gadgets
- Forged code (function) pointers
- Sealing and unsealing gadgets
- CVTP gadget (makes arbitrary code pointers)

#### An adversary can...

- Read and write data inside the compartment
- Access and infer data in the compartment
- Modify register values to "program" gadgets
- Create valid code pointers
- Take over control flow\*

## **Primitives for cross-domain transition**

branch with link



## **Primitives for cross-domain transition**

#### LPB, ULB, BSP


- Work on capability pair {data, code} that can be referred to as "compartment descriptor"
- Are associated with a branch operation
- Update frame pointer CFP
- Involve an unsealing-during-branch operation which means they work on sentries
- Are easy to deploy
- Non-atomic stack isolation
- Have similar security properties, however Branch to Sealed Pair primitive is robust against compartment descriptor forgery attack

### Switch to Restricted Mode

- Switch to Restricted Mode is special
- No custom branch operation is required
- No unsealing (except for common RB-unsealing).
- Requires special version of libc and dynamic linker
- A special version of kernel supporting this might also be handy, although not required
- Atomic stack isolation

# **Morello Compartmentalisation**

Very basic compartment switch idea



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### **Purecap Compartmentalisation**

- Restricting stack accesses by initializing compartment's stack and switching stacks
- Heap accesses protected by capabilities returned by mmap or malloc or alike
- PC-relative accesses may be restricted in terms of PCC bounds and permissions (for example, preventing access to sensitive system registers)
- Any other sources of capabilities should be sanitized
- Arbitrary sized compartments: function, object, DSO, etc.
- Reusable compartment allocations (depending on trust model)

# 

# Trying out Morello at home

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### How to try Morello

- GNU and LLVM toolchains for Morello targets are available in source and binary form
- Arm traditionally provides Morello FVP that can be used to boot Android or Linux
- This can be used to build and run purecap Morello applications
- There are other tools that could be of interest for researchers and software developers
- All the above aims to provide quick hands-on experience with CHERI / Morello to help understand new properties, security guarantees, performance and deployment applications

### **CHERIseed and libshim**

- CHERIseed is based on CHERI/Morello LLVM and uses sanitizer-like approach
- Allows to build programs with CHERI semantics on widely available machines
- Enables step-by-step approach for porting existing code to CHERI
- Provides CHERI at C/C++ level and helps understand capabilities
- Open source
- Start here:
  - <u>https://git.morello-project.org/morello/llvm-project/-/blob/cheriseed/clang/docs/CHERIseed.rst</u>
  - <u>https://git.morello-project.org/morello/llvm-project/-/blob/cheriseed/clang/docs/CHERIseedDesign.rst</u>



# **Morello Instruction Emulator**


### What's inside

- DBT tool for running Morello applications in a non-Morello Linux environment
- Capability registers
- Memory tags
- Syscall translation: libshim or work-in-progress built-in support

#### What it does

- Experiments with Morello applications on non-Morello AArch64 Linux systems
- Evaluate compartment solutions and experiment with the new syscall ABI
- Test, debug and trace existing software being ported to Morello
- Trace-based performance analysis and cache modelling

#### How it works



https://developer.arm.com/downloads/-/morello-instruction-emulator https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102270/

### **Resources and more information**

- <u>https://www.arm.com/architecture/cpu/morello</u>
- <u>https://developer.arm.com/Tools and Software/Morello Development Tools</u>
- <u>https://www.morello-project.org/</u>

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