
Between the Lines: VM Assumptions


Laurence Tratt https://tratt.net/laurie/


2020-11-05


What happens if we're wrong?





















VM development is a never-ending process


What is the best possible performance for an input *P*?















We don't know how well we're doing

Most optimisations are ad-hoc and/or unpredictable

Most optimisations are ad-hoc and/or unpredictable

e.g. mono \rightarrow poly \rightarrow megamorphic JS calls

How to communicate optimisations to users?

What is the effect of e.g. pointer tagging?

What is the effect of e.g. pointer tagging?

GC and register allocation only fairly deeply studied topics?

Hardware

Hardware: caches

Hardware: caches, predictors

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

OS

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

OS: other processes

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

OS: other processes, context switches

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

OS: other processes, context switches, etc.

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

OS: other processes, context switches, etc.

VM

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

OS: other processes, context switches, etc.

VM: compilation heuristics

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.

OS: other processes, context switches, etc.

VM: compilation heuristics, GC heuristics

Hardware: caches, predictors, temperature, etc.


OS: other processes, context switches, etc.


VM: compilation heuristics, GC heuristics, etc. We know how features interact


Performance non-determinism is rife

────► t











Solution to performance non-determinism

Solution to performance non-determinism: non-determinism?





Microbenchmarks behave poorly

But that doesn't affect real programs

How convenient!

What about compositionality?

VMs are expensive to create

VMs are expensive to create

Why not reuse that hard work?

VMs are expensive to create

Why not reuse that hard work?

CPython vs. Jython parable



















One solution: language design tweaks

WASM will not solve the semantic mismatch

Semantic mismatch

WASM will not solve the semantic mismatch

Meta-VMs suffer much less

Fix memory leak in pdfjs.js. #42

ltratt wants to merge 2 commits into chromium:master from ltratt:master @


🛱 Conversation	7	- Commits	2	💀 Checks	0	🗈 Files changed	1
----------------	---	-----------	---	----------	---	-----------------	---



Itratt commented on Oct 2, 2016 • edited +

A large amount of data is pushed into the global variable canvas_logs which isn't cleared in runPdfJS. On each iteration the list grows, eventually significantly so.

On a Linux machine with a recent-ish V8, it manages 2777 iterations before an alocation fails (at which point it's allocated over 2GiB of virtual memory, and used about 1.4Gib) and V8 crashes (Fatal error in CALL_AND_RETRY_LAST).



A year with Spectre: a V8 perspective

Published 23 April 2019 tagged with security

On January 3, 2018, Google Project Zero and others <u>disclosed</u> the first three of a new class of vulnerabilities that affect CPUs that perform speculative execution, dubbed <u>Spectre</u> and <u>Meltdown</u>. Using the <u>speculative execution</u> mechanisms of CPUs, an attacker could temporarily bypass both implicit and explicit safety checks in code that prevent programs from reading unauthorized data in memory. While processor speculation was designed to be a microarchitectural detail, invisible at the architectural level, carefully crafted programs could read unauthorized information in speculation and disclose it through side channels such as the execution time of a program fragment.

We have experimented with (1) by inserting the recommended speculation barrier instructions, such as Intel's LFENCE, on every critical conditional branch, and by using <u>retpolines</u> for indirect branches. Unfortunately, such heavy-handed mitigations greatly reduce performance (2–3× slowdown on the Octane benchmark). Instead, we chose approach (2), inserting mitigation sequences that prevent reading secret data due to mis-speculation. Let us illustrate the technique on the following code snippet:

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Benchmark suites a finite representation of infinite behaviour


Benchmark suites a finite representation of infinite behaviour

All benchmark suites are imperfect

Benchmark suites a finite representation of infinite behaviour

All benchmark suites are imperfect

We need more and more benchmarks!



Source: https://www.cvedetails.com/product/19117/Oracle-JRE.html?vendor_id=93

C/C++ aren't very safe

C/C++ aren't very safe

And what about JITted code?

C/C++ aren't very safe

And what about JITted code?

Prediction: VM security apocalypse is possible

What about Rust?

What about Rust?

Not an obvious fit for VMs

What about Rust?

Not an obvious fit for VMs

Can we make it so?

VMs use dynamic dispatch extensively

VMs use dynamic dispatch extensively

```
use std::mem::size_of;
trait T { }
fn main() {
  assert_eq!(size_of::<&bool>(), size_of::<&u128>());
  assert_eq!(size_of::<&bool>(), size_of::<usize>());
  assert_eq!(size_of::<&dyn T>(), size_of::<usize>() * 2);
}
```

```
let x: &dyn T = ...;
let (ptr, vtable) = unsafe {
  mem::transmute<_, (*mut u8, *mut u8)>(x)
};
```

```
struct ThinPtr { objptr: *mut u8 }
    let objptr = malloc(size_of::<*mut u8>() + size_of::<U>());
  fn deref(\&self) -> \&(dvn T + 'static) {
    let vtable = unsafe { ptr::read(objptr, size_of::<*mut u8>()) };
    unsafe { transmute::<(*const _, *const _), _>((self.objptr + 1, vtable)) }
```

```
struct ThinPtr { objptr: *mut u8 }
```

```
#[narrowable_abgc(ThinObj)]
 if let Some(o) = v.try_downcast::<VMInt>() {
```

Can we use Rust for VMs?

Can we use Rust for VMs?

So far, so good

The security landscape is changing

The security landscape is changing

CHERI:

The security landscape is changing

CHERI: capabilities in 128-bit pointers

IronPython; Jython; Nuitka; Psyco; PyPy; Pyston; Shed Skin; Stackless; Starkiller; TrufflePython; Unladen Swallow; WPython; Zippy

IronPython; Jython; Nuitka; Psyco; PyPy; Pyston; Shed Skin; Stackless; Starkiller; TrufflePython; Unladen Swallow; WPython; Zippy

e.g. compiling to LLVM fails every time...

We often pretend trade-offs don't exist

We often pretend trade-offs don't exist

Huge burden for newcomers to the field

Where can we go next?

We understand less than we should

Clear problems

Opportunities!

Opportunities!

Hardware meta-tracing

FL Interpreter

```
elif instr == INSTR VAR SET:
```

elif instr == INSTR_IF: result = stack.pop() if result == True: program_counter += 1 else: program_counter += read_jump_if_instruction() elif instr == INSTR_ADD: lhs = stack.pop() rhs = stack.pop() if isinstance(lhs, int) and isinstance(rhs, int): stack.push(lhs + rhs) else: ... program_counter += 1


FL Interpreter


<i>FL</i> Interpreter	User program (lang <i>FL</i>)
<pre>program_counter = 0; stack = [] vars = {} while True: jit_merge_point(program_counter) instr = load_instruction(program_counter) if instr == INSTR_VAR_GET: stack.push(vars[read_var_name_from_instruction()]) program_counter += 1 elif instr == INSTR_VAR_SET: vars[read_var_name_from_instruction()] = stack.pop() program_counter += 1 elif instr == INSTR_INT: stack.push(read_int_from_instruction()) program_counter += 1 elif instr == NSTR_LESS_THAN: rhs = stack.pop() lhs = stack.pop() if isinstance(lhs, int) and isinstance(rhs, if lhs < rhs: stack.push(False) else: program_counter += 1</pre>	


FL Interpreter


```
elif instr == INSTR VAR SET:
```


Initial trace























Meta-tracer performance (now)




Meta-tracer performance (now)



Meta-tracer performance (now)



Meta-tracer performance (Rust + PT)



Status:

Status: hello world

Thanks

• EPSRC: *COOLER* and *Lecture*.

- Oracle.
- Cloudflare.

